Past developments show that, on the whole, African food crops and supply chains have responded to the urban challenge. The agricultural system marketed by farmers has increased as has the ratio of non-farming population to farming population. Between 1930 and 2030, the urban environment will have absorbed 70 percent of the population growth.

On the other hand, despite the adjustments of the 1980s, African export agriculture has lost competitiveness and commercial food crops have partly replaced export crops as a source of cash income.

The connection to the market was gradually made through marketed food crops, which played an increasing role in the share of market GDP in agricultural GDP at the expense of export crops and self-consumed food crops. By giving priority to low urban prices, food supply policies have certainly not encouraged a dynamic domestic market. However, marketed food production increased from 56 percent of monetized agricultural GDP in 1970 to 73 percent in 1990 for West Africa (WALTPS, 1994). Overall, changes in rural settlement density have followed the development of urban markets.

Incentives to produce have increased with proximity to cities, but production constraints have become more severe. As a result of these opposing factors, productivity per unit area and per farmer is inversely proportional to distance from cities.

The question is whether this past evolution will continue and allow rural and urban demand to be met without too many difficulties and crises.

What is the demographic outlook?

The decline in net migration from 2 percent to 1 percent per year, combined with the drop in natural growth from 3 percent to 2.5 percent per year, suggests that urban growth will fall from 5 percent to 3.5 percent by the year 2020. Between 1990 and 2020, the urban population will grow at an average rate of 4.2 percent in West Africa, compared with 6.3 percent between 1960 and 1990. The urban population will increase by a factor of 3.5. It can be estimated that the rural population will grow by 1% per year, i.e., an increase of 40%. At a constant rate of urbanization, the average growth rate of cities would be about 2.71 percent, compared with 3.31 percent for the period 1960-80. In absolute terms, however, this means that the urban population will double in less than twenty years.

What are the agricultural prospects?

Food-producing agriculture will have to meet these growing needs. This is likely to result in increasing differentiation within the peasantry.

According to a rough calculation, in West Africa, where there are areas of high density, yields should be multiplied by 2.3 and labor productivity by 3.1 on average over the next 25 years. It is not clear that agricultural systems would respond to such challenges and that the resulting economic imbalances would not be very high (Griffon, Marty, 1993).

The average agricultural surplus per capita (agricultural production brought to market beyond the producers’ own food supply) is expected to double in the next few years, which would imply high investments in intensification.

African agriculture will need a technical revolution (animal traction, intensification, resistant seeds, and even a combination of animal husbandry and animal traction). The trend is towards a certain intensification of rainfed agriculture and the dissemination of improved “traditional” technologies. On the other hand, an Asian-style green revolution studied by G. Etienne would require irrigation works, property rights around medium-sized farms and expensive inputs, which seem unlikely in the near future.

According to the forecasts of WALTPS (1994), in 2020, the agricultural sector in West Africa will provide 14% of the gross regional product. There will be a strong differentiation within the peasantry. 25 million farmers (15% of the total) will produce the quantities necessary to supply 40% of consumers, i.e. 100 million; their productivity will reach five times the self-subsistence level, whereas the average productivity of the 150 million farmers will remain at a level close to two times the self-subsistence level. It can be assumed that calorie needs will increase sharply. The growth is estimated at 250% between 1995 and 2050. Most of this will come from plant-based energy.

Which supply channels?

Intraregional trade through commercial channels will play an increasing role in supplying cities. In West Africa, regional trade is expected to contribute 22% of imports, compared to 9% in 1990. The imported share of food demand would increase from 11% to 15%. Intraregional trade would account for more than half, compared to 14% in 1990 (WALTPS, 1994).

Everything suggests that there will be both strong instability in international prices and a tendency for food prices to rise as a result of the reduction in subsidies and protection for agriculture in industrialized countries following the WTO agreements. Africa’s food bill is likely to rise sharply if import substitution does not occur in a significant way.

The plurality of supply channels is likely to be maintained. Intensive agriculture will be localized more according to land conditions than market proximity. The intensification of agriculture in areas far from cities will, however, require an increased professionalization of intermediation tasks. It will reduce the weight of domestic circuits and short circuits. If public channels are unlikely to re-emerge, domestic channels will continue to exist but will play a secondary role compared to market channels. Wholesalers will play an important role. These market channels will be linked to industrial organizations.

Spatial disparities will have to be managed through land use planning and a dense network of infrastructure. In French-speaking West Africa, Abidjan and Dakar will be the driving markets. The densification of urban networks and the intensification of supplies will require a major improvement in medium-distance transport. Most of the links will concern the “hinterland” of coastal areas in West Africa.

How to manage food supplies to cities?

We have seen the complexity of the supply circuits, which require management at various levels.

It is of course necessary to take into account the major national trends that concern both the international market and demographic factors and therefore to set up forecasting units. Policies must also be highly flexible in order to respond to instabilities and risks, and emergency units must be set up to respond immediately to disasters (drought, wars, epidemics).

It is also necessary to implement actions at the level of decentralized communities and municipalities. These are only effective if they allow for concerted action between the various private and public operators involved in the supply chains. Contractualized relations are generally the most effective in the face of inefficient bureaucratic structures and speculative market risks.

Finally, action must be taken at the micro level of neighborhoods, domestic units and individuals. The precarious and vulnerable groups and individuals are those who are excluded from the market (due to a lack of solvent demand), from public channels (due to a lack of access to subsidized or donated products) and from family and social food distribution networks. This action requires the mobilization of public authorities, neighborhood associations and voluntary, secular and religious organizations, with the cooperation and support of international donors.

African agriculture, as Gilbert Etienne’s work emphasizes, should not be understood from a technical point of view or from a liberal or state ideal model. Social, historical, institutional and human factors weigh heavily. The administrations and actors in the sectors play an important role alongside the peasantry. Consequently, bureaucratic models that favor top-down supervision, self-management models that take the point of view of bottom-up actors, and neoliberal models that emphasize market laws must be put into perspective in the face of the resistance of organizational models and their own dynamics.

Source : Phillipe Hugon – Agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa in its institutional environment

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